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The Crime Behind the Bedroom Door:
Unequal Governmental Regulation of
Civilian and Military Spouses
Krista Bordatto*
I. INTRODUCTION
Unbeknownst to soldiers, when they sign on the dotted line,
pledging to defend the freedom America stands for, they also sign away
their freedom to make decisions regarding their private sex life.1 The
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) mandates that a soldier be
subject to prosecution for having sexual intercourse with someone who is
not his or her spouse. Although a majority of states have done away with
the historical norm of criminalizing adultery, choosing instead to simply
use evidence of adultery to support divorce petitions, the military continues
to vigorously prosecute adulterous acts.2 In this regard, the military sees
itself as a separate entity from the government, capable of ignoring a
soldier’s fundamental right to procedural due process protection.3
However, as a separate entity, the military should provide greater
protection rather than further deprivation. While the military may have
justification to limit the fundamental rights of soldiers in some instances,
such as freedom of speech, because of military necessity, the
criminalization of adultery represents too great an allocation of power
when balancing a governmental interest and the individual protections
guaranteed by the Constitution.4 Military necessity does not justify the
criminalization of adultery, nor does the preservation of marriage or
upholding societal views of morality provide adequate justification for the

*First Lieutenant, Florida Army National Guard; J.D., St. Thomas University School of
Law, 2014; M.S., St. Thomas University, 2014; B.S. Psychology, University of Oregon,
2010. This paper is written from my own personal perspective gained from serving in the
military. I would like to thank Professor Stephen Plass for providing his insight and
confidence in my writing potential and my husband for his love and support.
1. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. IV, ¶ 51 & ¶ 62 (2012)
[hereinafter MCM 2012], available at http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/mcm.pdf.
2. See list of states that currently criminalize adultery infra note 38
3. See discussion on “separate society” theory and how the military uses it to justify its
refusal to apply the Lawrence standards, infra notes 191–193.
4. See discussion infra section VII.
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deprivation of liberty that prosecution under the UCMJ entails.5 Currently,
the expansive language of the UCMJ gives commanders broad discretion to
choose which instances of adultery warrant prosecution and which do not.6
In order to effectuate a balance, this article proposes revising the elements
of Article 134 to include an additional element, which would effectively
limit a commander’s discretion while preserving the military’s ability to
prosecute under a compelling governmental interest without infringing on
the soldier’s fundamental right of privacy.7
A recent article proposes that the elimination of adultery from the
black letter law of Article 134 would benefit not only service members, but
also civilians, and improve the public perception of the armed forces.8 The
article further suggests that existing punishments under the UCMJ, such as
the punishments against fraternization, are sufficient to achieve the same
goals.9 On the surface, this seems like a viable solution; however,
fraternization is limited to inappropriate relationships between service
members and does not prohibit relationships between service members and
civilians.10 Moreover, the complete elimination of adultery from the UCMJ
would permit instances where sexual relationships are a clear disruption to
unit cohesion, such as when a soldier has sex with another soldier’s spouse,
which is not prohibited under fraternization or any other article.11 Despite
the fact that the current language of Article 134 poses serious problems
under the Fifth Amendment, the removal of adultery from the UCMJ would
require an overhaul of several other articles in order for the legitimate goals
of the military’s prohibition on adultery to be met through other means.12
Therefore, without an extensive overhaul, removing adultery from the
black-letter law of the UCMJ is not a feasible option at this time.
Another article suggests that raising the level of scrutiny applied to
adultery prosecutions from rational basis to intermediate scrutiny is
sufficient to balance the interests of the government and give service
5. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2013); see discussion of maximum punishment infra note 43.
6. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
7. See proposed revision of the elements required to prosecute adultery under the UCMJ
infra Part VII.
8. See Katherine Annuschat, An Affair to Remember: the State of the Crime of Adultery
in the Military, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1161, 1200 (2010). See also C. Quince Hopkins,
Rank Matters But Should Marriage?: Adultery, Fraternization, and Honor in the Military, 9
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 177, 260 (1999) (finding that the military should remove the general
prohibition on adultery and only sanction specific instances such as between service
members and with another service member’s spouse).
9. Annuschat, supra note 8 at 1200.
10. See MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 83 (Fraternization policies vary by branch of
service, but all branches prohibit inappropriate relationships between service members
holding positions of power and their subordinates.)
11. MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 83.
12. See Hopkins, supra note 8, at 260 (suggesting an overhaul of the UCMJ to add
specific offenses while removing adultery generally).
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members the same privacy rights as civilians.13 The author makes the
argument that adultery is on the periphery of fundamental rights and,
therefore, deserves more protection than afforded by rational basis, but less
than the full protection of strict scrutiny.14 While I agree that adultery
prosecutions should be subject to a higher level of scrutiny,15 without the
Supreme Court changing the pattern of giving great deference to the
military courts, the disparity will remain.
This article begins in Part I by giving a brief introduction describing
the problems the current language of Article 134 creates and other authors’
proposed solutions.16 Part II focuses on tracing the history of the
prohibition of adultery in both the civilian sector and the military.17 Part III
investigates how adultery is handled in the military, what constitutes
adultery under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the disparity in
civilian and military prosecutions.18
Part IV shows how military
prosecutions encourage deception in some instances, but punishes it in
others.19 Part V makes the argument that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right and, therefore, soldiers are entitled, like civilians, to
protection under the Constitution.20 Part VI investigates how the military
justifies prosecuting adultery and why those justifications are insufficient to
excuse the encroachment upon a fundamental right.21 Part VII argues the
broad level of discretion given to commanders in prosecuting adultery is
inadequate to balance the interests between the soldier and the government
and offers a proposed revision to the elements of Article 134.22

II. FROM PAST TO PRESENT ADULTERY LAWS
Intercourse between two consenting adults is generally regarded by
modern society as falling outside of governmental jurisdiction.23 However,
when either of the consenting individuals is married to someone else, the
issue becomes quite complex.24 Adultery is one of the most ancient,
recognizable cultural norms regulating familial relationships that still exist

13. See Raul V. Esquivel, III, Implications of the Military’s Proscription of Adultery
Upon Individual Privacy, 47 LOY. L. REV. 835, 854 (2001).
14. Id.
15. See discussion on intermediate scrutiny infra Part VII.
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See infra Part VII.
22. See infra Part VIII.
23. See discussion on lack of prosecution in most states today, infra notes 39–40.
24. See Melissa A. Haggard, Adultery: A Comparison of Military Law and the
Controversy This Causes Under Our Constitution and Criminal Justice System, 37
BRANDEIS L.J. 469, 469 (1998).
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today.25 While adultery began as an economic regulation, it was integrated
into law, religion, and public views of morality in an attempt to preserve
the institution of marriage.26 The first laws to criminalize adultery were
biblical27 and can be traced back to Hebraic times.28 At common law,
adultery was not a crime,29 but was punishable by the church as an
“ecclesiastical offense” against a commandment from God.30 Generally,
adultery was wrong only if the woman was married, due to potential
inheritance and property issues if an illegitimate child resulted from the
affair.31 Illegitimate children were unable to inherit the property of the
adulterer’s husband and would impede the husband’s bloodline.32 The
inheritance and property concerns stem from the obsolete idea that men
owned their wives as chattels33 and were, therefore, the sole owners of their
wives’ sexual services, which included procreation.34 In 1873, the
Supreme Court even went as far as to say,
[t]he constitution of the family organization . . . indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood . . . [where] [t]he paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother.35
Astonishingly, for the purpose of separation or divorce, it was possible
to rule that wives had deserted or abandoned their husbands by refusing to

25. LYNN ATWATER, PH.D., THE EXTRAMARITAL CONNECTION 16 (1982).
26. See ATWATER, supra note 25, at 16–17. Puritanism made stringent efforts to repress
sexuality before and during marriage. ATWATER, supra note 25, at 17.
27. Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J.
FAM. L. 45, 46 (1991–1992). See generally Exodus 20:14; Leviticus 20:10; Deuteronomy
22:22 (declaring that adultery is prohibited through a commandment from God and is
punishable by death).
28. See ATWATER, supra note 25, at 16.
29. United States v. Hickson, 22 M.J. 146, 147 (C.M.A. 1986), overruled by United
States v. Hill, 48 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
30. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 377 (2d ed. 1969) (citing FREDERICK POLLOCK &
FREDERIC MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 543 (2d ed. 1899)); Jeremy D. Weinstein,
Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 225 (1986).
31. See Haggard, supra note 24, at 471.
32. Haggard, supra note 24, at 471.
33. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W. 2d 422, 423 (Ky. 1992); see Jacob Lippman, The
Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 652–53 (1930) (explaining AngloSaxon common law was based on tortuous interference with a marriage by a third person).
The wife was considered a superior servant to her husband, and because of that he was
entitled to compensation if he lost her services due to enticement by another man. See
Lippman, supra. The husband was entitled to compensation for loss of consortium, which
was defined as bundle of legal rights to his wife’s services, society, and sexual intercourse.
Lippman, supra.
34. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W. 2d at 423.
35. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873).
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submit to a sexual relationship.36 Eventually laws were passed to reflect
the Puritan ideals of repressing sexuality and, consequently, morality began
to define acceptable sexual behavior.37
Although at least thirteen states still maintain adultery laws,38 the
prosecution of adultery is extremely rare today.39 In the last decade there
have been several high-profile adultery scandals that have astounded the
American public, but none of the participants faced criminal prosecution
despite the fact that their respective states have adultery statutes.40 This
suggests that the public no longer expects adultery to be the subject of
criminal prosecution, even when committed by important governmental
figures.41 Moreover, as exhibited by recommendation from the drafters of
the Model Penal Code in 1955, adultery was no longer to be considered a
criminal offense42 and criminalization of adultery has been disfavored for
quite some time.43
36. See Hayes v. Hayes, 78 P. 19 (Cal. 1904); see also Campbell v. Campbell, 112 N.W.
481 (Mich. 1907); Graves v. Graves, 41 So. 384 (Miss. 1906); Whitfield v. Whitfield, 15
S.E. 543 (Ga. 1892); Stein v. Stein, 5 Colo. 55 (1879);
Fleegle v. Fleegle, 110 A. 889 (Md. 1920); Axton v. Axton, 206 S.W. 480 (Ky. 1918).
37. ATWATER, supra note 25, at 17.
38. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (2012); FLA STAT. § 798.01 (2012); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-6-9 (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6601 (2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-35 (2011);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL LAW § 10-501 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36 (West
2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (West 2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney
2012); N.D. CENT CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-09 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 871-72
(West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2011); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.16 (West 2012); see, e.g. United
States v. Hickson, 22 M.J. 146, 147 (C.M.A 1986) (deciding on a matter where states,
lacking a common law for adultery, were forced to enact statues making it a criminal
offense in order to deter adulterous conduct in preservation of the marital union rather than
compensation for husbands’ loss of property).
39. Kathryn R. Burke, The Privacy Penumbra and Adultery: Does Military Necessity
Justify an Adultery Regulation and What Will it Take for the Court to Declare it
Unconstitutional? 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 301, 310 (1997) (stating that statutory
language of the states that criminalize adultery suggest that prosecution for crimes of
adultery occur very rarely, if ever); see also 2 Am. Jur. Adultery § 1 (2012) (noting that,
although prosecutions for adultery or fornication have become rare in modern times, many
states continue to have statutory provisions that prohibit adultery; thus, the lack of
prosecutions does not invalidate the statute or make it judicially unenforceable).
40. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Spitzer Resigns, Citing Personal Failings, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar.
12,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/nyregion/12cnd-resign.html?
pagewanted=all&r=0; Jim Rutenberg & Shaila Dewan, Back at Work, Governor Puts
Apology on Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/
us/27sanford.html. For example, former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer was a client of a
prostitution ring. See Grynbaum, supra. Another example is South Carolina Governor
Mark Sanford’s secret affair with a woman from Argentina. See Rutenberg, supra.
41. See Annuschat, supra note 8 at 1169.
42. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955) (decriminalizing
fornication, adultery, and other sexual crimes not involving violence or children); Siegel,
supra note 27, at 95 (taking the stance that adultery was a private affair and, therefore,
outside the reaches of criminal law).
43. See Steven Lee Meyers, Military Weighing Changes in Policy Toward Adultery, N.Y.

BORDATTO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

100

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

10/31/14 4:24 PM

[Vol. 26:1

III. THE MILITARY’S DEFINITION OF ADULTERY
A. BACKGROUND
In sharp contrast to the civilian sector, the military has been actively
prosecuting adultery since May 5, 1950, when Congress enacted the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) pursuant to Article I of the
Constitution.44 Adultery is prosecutable when committed by soldiers
regardless of if it occurs with other soldiers of the same rank, different
rank, or with civilians.45 The provisions of the UCMJ are implemented by
the President through an executive order known as the Manual for CourtsMartial (MCM),46 which governs all members of the armed forces.47
Although adultery was specifically not listed as an offense under Article
134 until 1984,48 it was prosecuted under Article 134 generally if it
prejudiced good order and discipline, or brought discredit among the armed
forces. It was also prosecuted under Article 13, if it was determined to be
conduct unbecoming an officer or gentleman.49 Articles 77 through 134 of
the UCMJ are defined as the “punitive articles,” which list specific offenses
that, if violated, can result in a soldier being punished by court-martial.50
Adultery is listed as one of the offenses under Article 134, which is known
as the General Article.51 A soldier is guilty of adultery when the following
TIMES, July 19, 1998, www.nytimes.com/1998/07/19/us/military-weighing-changes-inpolicy-toward-adultery.html?pagewanted=all& src=pm. In 1998, a committee appointed by
former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen suggested making changes to the MCM that
would lessen the number of convictions for adultery under Article 134, and impose less
serious consequences. Id. The proposed changes kept adultery as an offense under Article
134, but would limit prosecutions to instances where the adulterous act disrupted the moral
or smooth functioning of a military unit. Id. In addition, it would discourage commanders
from prosecuting past affairs which had no effect on current service. Id.
44. See generally UCMJ (comprising §§ 801–946 of Title 10, U.S. Code).
45. Ian Fisher, Army’s Adultery Rule Is Don’t Get Caught, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1997,
www.nytimes.com/1997/05/17/us/army-s-adultery-rule-is-don-t-get-caught.html?page
wanted=all&src=pm.
46. See generally MCM 2012, supra note 1 (defining all offenses military members may
be charged with and the elements required to prove each offense).
47. MCM 2012, supra note 1; RULE FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (R.C.M.) 103 (2012) (Armed
forces are defined as Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard).
48. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. IV, ¶ 62 (1984) [hereinafter
MCM 1984], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM_1984change3.pdf. The MCM was amended in 1984, which added an adultery statute. Id.
49. See MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 59 & ¶ 62.
50. 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934. There are three different kinds of Courts-Martial in each of
the Armed Forces: General Courts-Martial, Special Courts-Martial, and Summary CourtsMartial. Id.
51. Id. at § 934. Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of
which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a
general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the
offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court. Id.
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elements are met: (1) that the accused wrongfully had sexual intercourse
with a certain person; (2) that, at the time, the accused or the other person
was married to someone else;52 and, (3) that, under the circumstances, the
conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces53 or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces.54 If found guilty of adultery, soldiers are subject to court-martial
and face the prospect of receiving the maximum punishment of
dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
confinement for one year.55
B. DISPARATE TREATMENT
While adultery prosecution may be almost obsolete in the civilian
sector, prosecution in the military is on the rise.56 During the 1990s alone,
over nine hundred men and women were court-martialed for adultery.57
This trend continues as increasing pressure is placed on the military by
Congress to remove a commander’s authority to prosecute sex crimes. Not
only is the rate at which military personnel are prosecuted extremely high
in comparison to the civilian sector, the disparity between the harsh
punishments a solider can receive,58 and the wide range of reprimands,59 or
52. See Fisher, supra note 45 (Fisher, in his article, states that the third element is
subjective in comparison to the first two, which seem relatively clear.).
53. MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2) (“Adulterous conduct that is directly
prejudicial includes conduct that has an obvious, and measurably divisive effect on unit or
organization discipline, morale, or cohesion, or is clearly detrimental to the authority or
stature of or respect toward a service member.”).
54. MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2) “Discredit means to injure the reputation
of the armed forces and includes adulterous conduct that has a tendency, because of its open
or notorious nature, to bring the service into disrepute, make it subject to public ridicule, or
lower it in public esteem.” MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(b); see United States v.
Saunders, 59 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 2003) (stating that an accused soldier is entitled to fair notice
of the elements of the charge, but this does not necessarily require the precise wording of
the elements to be given in a published notice).
55. MCM 2012, supra note 2, pt. IV, ¶ 62(e).
56. See Annuschat, supra note 9, 1165–74 (asserting that military prosecutions are
gaining momentum in spite of a decline in the civilian sector).
57. James M. Winner, Beds with Sheets but No Covers: The Right to Privacy and the
Military’s Regulation of Adultery, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1077 (1998).
58. MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶62(e).
59. See FLA. STAT. § 798.01 (2012) (stating that whoever lives in an open state of
adultery shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-199
(2012) (“A married person commits the offense of adultery . . . shall be punished as for a
misdemeanor”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6601 (2012) (“[S]hall be punished by a fine of not
less than $ 100, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than three months, or by
imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period not exceeding three years, or in the
county jail for a period not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding $1000.”); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/11-35 (2011) (stating that adultery is a Class A misdemeanor); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIMINAL LAW § 10-501 (2002) (“A person who violates this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor and on conviction shall be fined $10.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36 (2012).
An individual “may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment
of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both . . . [n]o prosecution shall be commenced under
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lack thereof, in the civilian sector is remarkable.60 Despite the possibility
of strict retribution, service members see adultery as a common occurrence
in the military.61 Adultery has been ignored, and in some instances
accepted,62 because of the nature of military service. Due to the fact that
less than one percent of the nation serves in the military, soldiers are often
forced to spend long periods away from their family in order to fight the
wars abroad and on United States soil.63 Thus, soldiers should not be
placed at a disadvantage for being among the few who defend the nation.
In an effort to reconcile the zealous prosecution of adultery in the
military with its rarity in which it occurs in the civilian sector, military
courts have generally found that service members should be held to a
higher standard than civilians because of their unique commitment of
loyalty and duty to the United States.64 Not surprisingly, the standard is
heightened further for officers due to “the nature of an officer’s
commission [which] demonstrates that he has been selected from among
the populace as a whole to hold a position of trust and honor . . . [and this
position] puts him in a different legal status than the enlisted man or the
civilian.”65 “While an enlisted accused is subject to a punitive discharge
this section except on complaint of the husband or the wife, except when such husband or
wife is insane, nor after one year from the commission of the offense.” Id.
60. See state statutes cited supra note 38. States not listed do not criminalize adultery
and, therefore, have no punishment.
61. See Fisher, supra note 45.
62. Fisher, supra note 45 (noting that brothels flourish around military bases where it is
not a secret that many military customers are married).
63. Sam Nunn, The Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence in
Military Cases, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 557, 558 (1994).
Military service is a unique calling. It is more than a job. Our nation asks the
men and women of the armed forces to make extraordinary sacrifices to
provide for the common defense. While civilians remain secure in their
homes, with broad freedom to live where and with whom they choose,
members of the armed forces may be assigned, involuntarily, to any place in
the world, often on short notice, often to places of grave danger, often in the
most spartan and primitive conditions.
Id. at 558. See also, Karl W. Eikenberry and David M Kennedy, Op-Ed., Americans and Their
Military, Drifting Apart, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
05/27/opinion/americans-and-their-military-drifting-apart.html?pagewanted=all.
Some
estimates have been as low as 0.5 percent of the U.S. population. Id. Moreover, the
Congressional Research Service has documented 144 deployments in the last forty years. Id.
64. MCM 2012, supra note 1, R.C.M 1003(b)(10); United States v. Kirksey, 20 C.M.R.
272, 275 (C.M.A. 1955) (“[T]he ancient ethical traditions of the profession of arms . . . have
always dictated a high standard of promissory responsibility.”); see United States v. Means,
10 M.J. 162, 166 (C.M.A. 1981) (“Since officers have special privileges and hold special
positions of honor, it is not unreasonable that they be held to a high standard of
accountability.”).
65. United States v. Free, 14 C.M.R. 466, 471 (N.B.R. 1953); see also United States v.
Tedder, 24 M.J. 176, 182 (C.M.A. 1987) (noting that because of an officer’s special status, a
higher standard of conduct may be required of him); United States v. Johanns, 17 M.J. 862,
868 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983) (stating officers are held to a higher standard of conduct than
enlisted personnel and their conduct should be exemplary).
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only when it is specifically authorized for the offense charged, an officer is
subject to punitive separation for any violation of the [UCMJ].”66 While
the disparity between officer and enlisted standards is understandable, the
fact that many civilians hold positions requiring the same loyalty and duty
to our country but are not held to the same standard seems hypocritical.67
For example, one would assume that the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces would be held to at least the same standard as military
personnel, if not higher; however, this assumption is wholly incorrect.68
Although the Commander-in-Chief has the final say in all military law, as a
civilian he is not subject to the standards in which he creates. The scandals
involving former President Bill Clinton, then Commander-in-Chief,
highlight the inequality of the standard being applied.69 Despite the title,
former President Clinton was not subject to prosecution under the UCMJ
and, therefore, did not face the repercussions a soldier surely would have.70
Interestingly, it was well known that President Clinton engaged in
adulterous conduct before he was elected President; yet, America voted
him into office and subsequently acted outraged when he continued his
affairs during his Presidency.71 As with military members, sometimes a
blind eye is turned, and sometimes it is not. In addition to the inequality of
prosecutions and punishments between soldiers and civilians, the disparate
approaches of adultery in the military are also troubling.72

66. United States v. March, 32 M.J. 740, 742 (A.C.M.R. 1991) (citing R.C.M
1003(b)(10)).
67. See Haggard, supra note 24, at 477.
68. Id.
69. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 682 (1997); Haggard, supra note 24, at 477.
70. See Raul V. Esquivel, III supra note 13, at 844; Steven Lee Myers, Ex-general is
Charged with Lying and Adultery, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/
1998/12/11/us/ex-general-is-charged-with-lying-and-adultery.html (stating that some have
argued that the Commander-in-Chief should be held to the same moral standards spelled out
by the UCMJ); Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial
Process, 18 YALE L. & POL. REV. 53 (1999) (discussing Presidential immunity).
71. See Francis X. Clines, Testing the President: The Accuser; Jones Lawyers Issue Files
Alleging Clinton Pattern of Harassment of Women, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1988,
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/14/us/testing-president-accuser-jones-lawyers-issue-filesalleging-clinton-pattern.html?ref=genniferflowers&pagewanted=2; Bill Clinton: Beyond
Scandal and Adultery, REPORTING FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD (Feb. 24, 2012), http://public
goodreporting.wordpress.com/2012/02/24/bill-clinton-beyond-scandal-and-adultery/;
Michael S. James, Timeline: President Bill Clinton Through the Years, ABC NEWS (Feb. 11,
2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Bill_Clinton/timeline-president-bill-clinton-yearslife-presidency-post/story?id=247332.
72. Christopher Scott Maravilla, The Other Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Adultery Under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice After Lawrence v. Texas, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 659, 666
(2009) (expressing that the differences in the prosecution of Lt. Kelly Flinn and General
Kevin Byrnes show how subjective and unfair adultery prosecutions in the military are).
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1. Gender
The differences can be seen in the outcomes of several high-profile
adultery cases spanning the last two decades.73 Often, female soldiers
charged with adultery face much harsher consequences than male
soldiers.74 In a highly publicized case, Lieutenant Kelly Flinn, the nation’s
first female B-52 bomber pilot, faced a court-martial after being charged
with adultery, disobedience, and giving false statements.75 Lieutenant
Flinn found herself in a military courtroom after she fell in love with the
civilian husband of an enlisted woman located at the same military base as
Flinn.76 Marc Zigo, the married man, assured Flinn that his marriage was
over, even though he was living with the woman he was legally married
to.77 To Flinn, Zigo was her first love, a handsome soccer coach that
promised to marry her. After learning of the affair, Zigo’s wife, Airman
Gayla Zigo, complained to her supervisor about the affair and a formal
complaint was filed against Flinn after she refused to stop seeing Zigo.78
The formal complaint sparked an Air Force investigation that delved deep
into Flinn’s private sexual life. In an attempt to salvage her career, Flinn
denied having a sexual relationship with Zigo, but it was too late; Zigo had
already provided the military police with in depth details about their sexual
relationship, including how often they had sex, methods of birth control,
and Flinn’s sexual preferences.79 Subsequently, based upon Flinn’s
adulterous affair and her conduct during the investigation, the Air Force
initiated court-martial proceedings.80 However, Flinn refused to remain

73. See infra notes 74–91; United States v. Green, 39 M.J. 606 (A.M.C.R 1994); see also
Frank Bruni, Adultery Alone Often Fails to Prompt a Military Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/13/us/adultery-alone-often-fails-to-prompt
-a-military-prosecution.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (discussing factors, such as rank,
which influence the harshness of punishments for adultery); Craig Whitlock, Disgraced
Army General, Jeffrey A. Sinclair, Receives Fine, No Jail Time, THE WASHINGTON POST
(Mar. 20, 2014) (discussing the lack of punishment General Sinclair received and the
implications of it).
74. Bruni, supra note 73.
75. See Bruni, supra note 73; Elaine Sciolino, A Ridgity Flexible Notion of Truth, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/20/weekinreview/a-rigidly-flexiblenotion-of-truth.html?ref=kellyjflinn; Gregory L. Vistica & Evan Thomas, Sex and Lies: The
Strange Case of Lieutenant Flinn Is Over, but in the Military the War over Women Goes On,
NEWSWEEK (June 2, 1997), http://www.newsweek.com/sex-and-lies-173464; Tony
Capaccio, Pilot Errors, AM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 1997), http://www.ajr.org/article.asp
?id=336 (summarizing the entire Lt. Flinn case).
76. See Elaine Sciolino, From a Love Affair to a Court-Martial, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
1997, http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/12/14/home/airwoman-court-martial.html.
77. Id.
78. See Nancy Gibbs, Wings of Desire: The Air Force’s Star Female Pilot Finds Herself
Enmeshed in a Tale Full of Passion and Lies, TIME, (June 2, 1997), http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,986448,00.html
79. See Vistica & Thomas, supra note 75.
80. See Gibbs, supra note 78.
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silent and did everything in her power to let the American public know that
the Air Force had intruded into her private, personal life in order to enforce
an outwardly antiquated prohibition on adultery.81 Facing the end of her
accomplished career, a federal conviction and possible prison sentence,
Flinn had nothing else to lose. Her story won over the American public,
with many expressing their opinion that the military had no right to
interfere with soldiers’ off-base, off-duty conduct and must get out of
soldiers’ private bedrooms.82 Flinn was granted a general discharge after
the Air Force succumbed to the public and political pressure of prosecuting
an American hero.83 In the end, Flinn avoided a dishonorable discharge
and federal conviction for adultery, but at what cost? She endured an
abusive relationship, lost her career and benefits, and publicly became the
fallen star of the Air Force, all because she believed a man who lied.
Around the same time, Navy officials refused to subject Admiral Scudi
to a court-martial and possible prison sentence, and instead opted to give
him a much less severe closed administrative hearing.84 After serving in
the Navy for over three decades, Scudi was accused of improperly steering
military contracts, worth roughly $150,000, to a woman with whom he was
having an adulterous affair, of obstructing justice, and of giving false
statements, among other UCMJ charges.85 Flinn’s charges seem far more
innocuous to the government than Scudi’s, but Flinn was saved from a
court-martial and given a general discharge only because the Air Force
wanted to avoid intense criticism and charges of sexism.86 Instead of the
general discharge Flinn was given, Scudi was allowed to retire at a lower
rank with the full benefits of leaving the military on honorable terms.

81. See 60 Minutes: The Court-Martial of Lt. Flinn; First Woman Bomber Pilot on Trial
for Adultery (CBS television broadcast, May 11, 1997); Jamie McIntyre, Female Bomber
Pilot Trial on Hold, CNN.COM (May 20, 1997), http://www.cnn.com/US/9705/20/
flinn.trial/index.html?_s=PM:US.
82. See Internight (NBC television broadcast, July 7, 1997) (discussing the Lt. Kelly
Flinn case and soliciting public views).
83. See Gibbs, supra note 78. Lieutenant Kelly Flinn first submitted a request to resign
but conditioned on receiving an honorable discharge; the Secretary of the Air Force quickly
denied Flinn’s request. Gibbs, supra note 78. However, the secretary did accept Flinn’s
subsequent request to resign conditioned on a general discharge. See Gibbs, supra note 78.
84. See Frank Bruni, Admiral Accepting Guilt in Ethics Case, Will Retire, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/03/us/admiral-accepting-guilt-in-ethicscase-will-retire.html; Bruni, Adultery Alone, supra note 73; Sciolino, supra note 75; Mark
Thompson, Sex, the Army and a Double Standard, TIME, May 4, 1998, at 30. (noting that Lt.
Flinn would have faced almost 10 years in prison if convicted).
85. See Myers, supra note 70; Admiral Charged with Adultery and Ethics Violation,
CNN.com (Nov. 25, 1998), http://www.cnn.com/US/9811/25/navy.adultery.01/ (noting he
served for 32 years).
86. See Bruni, Admiral Accepting Guilt, supra note 73.
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2. Rank
Disparity in the consequences of committing adultery may also be
attributed to high-ranking officers receiving more leniency than those of
lower ranks.87 Major General David Hale was allowed to retire, with an
honorable discharge, in February 1988 after the wife of another officer
filed a complaint that he coerced her into a sexual relationship.88 It was
only after public criticism that Army officials decided to charge General
Hale with seventeen counts of misconduct, including adultery, obstructing
justice, and making false statements.89 In the face of General Hale’s
confession during his court-martial that he had adulterous affairs with the
wives of four subordinates, his punishment merely consisted of a formal
reprimand, a $10,000 fine, and forfeiture of $1,000 per month pay for
twelve months.90 Although the Secretary of the Army subsequently
demoted General Hale to Brigadier General, many critics maintain he
should have received a prison sentence.91
Most recently, Brigadier General Jeffrey A. Sinclair was recently
spared a jail sentence after admitting to carrying on a three-year affair with
a female officer under his direct command and having two other
inappropriate relationships.92 Instead, he was given a reprimand, fined
$20,000, and will be able to retire.93 After pleading guilty to adultery,
maltreatment of his accuser, and the two additional unacceptable
relationships, Brig. Gen. Sinclair was permitted to retire honorably.94
While he was reduced by two ranks to Lieutenant Colonel, his attorney felt
that Brig. Gen. Sinclair’s fate was too harsh given “[o]ther senior military
leaders who committed the same indiscretions, and worse, have faced far
fewer consequences.”95 Nevertheless, precedent shows that an enlisted
87.
88.
89.
90.

See Bruni, Admiral Accepting Guilt, supra note 73.
See Thompson, supra note 84.
Bruni, Admiral Accepting Guilt, supra note 73.
See David Stout, Retired General is Penalized, Not Jailed, in Adultery Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/18/us/retired-general-is-penalizednot-jailed-in-adultery-case.html. General Hale was originally ordered to pay $1,466 per
month for twelve months, but it was reduced to $1,000. Id. His monthly pension at the time
was $6,312. Id. General Hale could have faced up to eleven years in prison. Id.
91. See Elizabeth Becker, Army Demotes Retired NATO Commander Who Admitted
Affairs With Wives of Subordinates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/
1999/09/03/us/army-demotes-retired-nato-commander-who-admitted-affairs-with-wives-sub
ordinates.html; Paul Richter, Army Demotes by 1 Rank Retired General in Sex Case, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/03/news/mn-6364.
92. Whitlock, supra note 73.
93. Id.
94. Id.; Paul Woolverton, Brig. Gen. Jeff Sinclair to Receive Reprimand, $20K Pay
Forfeiture, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, Mar. 20, 2014, http://www.fayobserver.com
/military/article_ea741779-ceab-5f12-a20d-19b2fd42e3a6.html?mode=jqm.
95. Drew Brooks, Army Strips Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Sinclair of Two Ranks, Reducing
Retirement Benefits, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, Jun. 20, 2014, http://www.fayobserver.com/
military/article_f55e6aa7-6bae-5c9b-a264-c095bf101bb7.html.
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soldier would have been dishonorably discharged and would have lost all
benefits, rather than mere reduction in retirement pension.
One commentator highlighted the punishment disparity among ranks in
her statement: “The military’s promises of ‘zero tolerance’ for sexual
offenses continues to ring hollow as yet another high ranking official is let
off the hook.”96 These cases provide a look into the two distinctly different
standards of military prosecutions: one that applies to the high-ranking, and
the other that applies to the “grunts.”97 Where is the equality and who is
responsible for setting the standard?98

IV. DECEPTION ENCOURAGED
Before the repeal of 10 U.S.C. § 654—colloquially known as “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell”—on September 20, 2011,99 non-heterosexual soldiers were forced
into living a life of deception in order to serve in the military.100 The choice
was simple: lie to everyone and pretend to be heterosexual,101 or face
punishment under the UCMJ.102 In other words, do what you want, but do not
do it blatantly and do not get caught.103 After the repeal, an active-duty Air
Force officer, who had kept his sexual orientation a secret, revealed: “I always
had the feeling that I was lying to them and that I couldn’t be part of the
96. Woolverton, supra note 94.
97. See generally Part III.B; Thompson/Washington, supra note 84.
98. See proposed revision to Article 134, infra Part VII.
99. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (repealed 2010).
100. Sciolino, supra note 75. See also, Kayla Webley, Brief History of Gays in the
Military, TIME (Feb. 2, 2010), available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1960257,00.html. Former President Bill Clinton attempted to unilaterally lift the ban
that prevented gays and lesbians from serving in the military, but was prevented from doing
so when Congress passed “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Id. As a result, this kept openly gay or
lesbian people from serving. Id. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” prevented new recruits from
being asked about sexuality on recruitment forms and during interviews, but it did not
prevent investigations to determine whether those serving were gay. Id.
101. See United States v. Eggen, 51 M.J. 159 (A.M.C.R 1999) (reasoning that a soldier
may say he was forcibly sodomized in order to protect his own military career, instead of
facing the consequences of having committed a homosexual act); James Dao, Discharged
for Being Gay, Veterans Seek to Re-enlist, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, http://www.ny
times.com/2011/09/05/us/05reenlist.html?pagewanted=all
(discussing
how
soldiers
sometimes lived shadow lives in the military, afraid that disclosure of their sexuality would
ruin carefully plotted careers).
102. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY, 4–19 (26 July 1999)
[hereinafter AR 600-20 1999]; United States v. Modesto, 39 M.J. 1055 (A.M.C.R. 1994).
Before “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was repealed, under AR 600-20, homosexuals were subject to
mandatory separation for engaging in, or soliciting another to engage in, homosexual acts. AR
600-20 1999, supra. Colonel Edward Modesto was convicted by court-martial for eight counts
of conduct unbecoming of an officer for committing sodomy, engaging in mutual
masturbation, indecently touching another male, cross-dressing in public, performing as a
female impersonator in a night club, and being photographed imitating fellatio with two other
men. Modesto, 39 M.J. at 1055. He was sentenced to dismissal, confinement for nine months,
and forfeiture of $3,000.00 pay for a period of nine months. Id.
103. See Fisher, supra note 45.
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military family.”104 In the eighteen years the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy
was in effect, more than 13,000 soldiers were discharged for being gay.105
With its repeal, the Department of Defense has now declared that sexual
orientation is a personal and private matter.106 Conversely, despite the attempt
of several individuals to decriminalize consensual sex, all other aspects of
soldiers’ sexual conduct remains a public matter subject to criminal
prosecution.107 Which is worse: having an affair or lying about having an
affair? The military seems to take the stance that, in matters of the heart, such
as sexuality, certain forms of deception are encouraged, but others are not.108
Although the long running double standard promoting deception about sexual
orientation has ended, stigma regarding other sexual matters remains.
Under the UCMJ, any person who knowingly deceives, “signs any false
record . . . or other official document, knowing it to be false, or makes any
other false official statement knowing it to be false, shall be punished as a
court-martial may direct.”109 Accordingly, Former President Clinton was
impeached with a charge of perjury, not adultery.110 The cases of Brigadier
General Sinclair, Lieutenant Flinn, Admiral Scudi, and General Hale are
instances where soldiers attempted to conceal their affairs to prevent being
criminalized, but did not go out of their way to cause disgrace to the Armed
Forces.111 While the difference between a lie and the truth can mean life or
death on the battlefield,112 under normal circumstances, hiding an affair may be
accepted in the name of privacy.113
104. Elisabeth Bumiller, Out and Proud to Serve, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/us/after-toiling-in-shadows-to-end-dont-ask-dont-tell-1st-ltjosh-seefried-greets-a-new-era.html?pagewanted=all.
105. See id.; Dao, supra note 101.
106. Memorandum from Clifford L. Stanley on the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
(Sept. 20, 2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_dadt/USDPR-DADT_Repeal_Day_Memo_20Sep.pdf.
107. Rowan Scarborough, Gays Use Adultery Issue as Military Springboard, WASH. TIMES,
June 18, 1997, at A1. An example is Representative Barney Frank who unveiled an
Amendment that would decriminalize consensual sexual acts such as adultery and sodomy. Id.
108. Sciolino, supra note 75.
109. MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 31.
110. See James Bennet, Impeachment: The President Impeached; President Digs In, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/20/us/impeachment-the-presidentclinton-impeached-president-digs-in.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm;
Allison
Mitchell,
Impeachment: The Overview – Clinton Impeached; He Faces a Senate Trial, 2D in History;
Vows to do Job Till Term’s ‘Last Hour’, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, http://query.nytimes.
com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9907EFDE143CF933A15751C1A96E958260&pagewanted=all.
111. Sciolino, supra note 75 (noting that if an affair is discreet, it hurts no one, and
concealment is a means to prevent becoming a criminal).
112. See United States. v. Sanchez, 39 M.J. 518, 521 (A.C.M.R. 1993) (stating that false
official statements can potentially interfere with mission accomplishment or result in the loss
of life); United States. v. Coates, 25 C.M.R. 559, 562 n.1 (A.C.M.R. 1958). “The reason for
this rigid requirement for personal integrity is that the critical test comes on the battlefield
when the lives of individuals are involved in the decisions which are made—based on
information accepted without question by those who have to make such decisions.” Id. at 562
(noting a letter from Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg).
113. See discussion on privacy infra Part V.A.
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V. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
A. RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to be free from government intrusion is the most
comprehensive right and the right most valued by civilized men.114
Although the Constitution does not expressly state that individuals are
entitled to the right of privacy,115 the Supreme Court has recognized that an
individual right to personal privacy has existed under the Constitution since
1891.116 The right to personal privacy can be found in: the First
Amendment,117 the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,118 the Ninth
Amendment,119 the Bill of Rights,120 and in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action.121 Accordingly,
there is a valid argument that intimate affairs should be protected from
governmental intrusion.122
In Griswold v. Connecticut,123 the Supreme Court established a right of
marital privacy when it held that the Connecticut law prohibiting the use of
114. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized man. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever
the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by
such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79.
115. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
116. See Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”).
117. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“For also fundamental is the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into
one’s privacy.”).
118. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968); Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Boyd
v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 621 (1886).
119. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
120. See Id. at 484–85.
121. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
122. See Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at
170; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; see also Major
Eugene E. Baime, Private Consensual Sodomy Should Be Constitutionally Protected in the
Military By the Right to Privacy, 171 MIL. L. REV. 91 (2002) (arguing that because soldiers
have a Constitutional right to privacy, they should not face criminal prosecution for
engaging in private consensual sodomy with another adult); Maravilla, supra note 72 at 669
(arguing that under the holding in Lawrence v. Texas, adulterous charges should be brought
under fraternization).
123. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
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contraceptives was an unconstitutional intrusion into the private lives of
married couples.124 The same freedoms were later guaranteed to unmarried
couples, under the Equal Protection Clause, in Eisenstadt v. Baird.125 In
Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court found the right to be free from
governmental intrusion is the right of the individual, regardless of their
marital status, because every individual has their own emotions and
intellectual abilities.126
Subsequently, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Constitution
guarantees protection for personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, abortion, bodily integrity, familial relationships,
and education.127 In Lawrence v. Texas128 the Supreme Court struck down
the Texas sodomy statute and overturned the Court’s prior decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick,129 which made it clear that the Court cannot control
the actions of individuals by making their private sexual conduct a criminal
offense.130 Consequently, the protection guaranteed by the Constitution
limits the government’s right to intrude upon an individual’s right to make
personal decisions relating to familial relationships and parenthood.131
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never accepted that the substantive
and procedural liberties protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
and recognized by the Bill of Rights are limited to the express provisions of
the first eight Amendments to the Constitution.132 Instead, precedent shows
that the breadth of liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause is not
limited to or constrained by the text of the Constitution.133
Individual liberty is one of the most fundamental rights protected by
the Constitution.134 Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly
stated that a fundamental right to privacy exists, the Court’s reading of
124. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
125. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
126. See Id.
127. See Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at
170; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
128. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
129. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
130. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
131. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 849.
132. See id. at 847–48.
133. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961).
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot
be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees
elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This ‘liberty’ is not a series of
isolated points pricked out in terms . . . It is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .
Id.
134. See Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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precedent in Lawrence proves otherwise.135 The right to privacy provides
all individuals, regardless of marital status, sexual orientation, or military
service, the right to make certain decisions and engage in certain acts
regarding their private lives.136 An individual’s right to privacy should
include an adult’s right to make decisions regarding all types of private,
consensual relations without government intrusion.137 Assuming the right
to privacy is fundamental and includes these consensual relations, the Due
Process Clause prevents the government from intruding on the private
sexual lives of individuals unless the intrusion is narrowly designed to
serve a compelling government interest.138
Wearing a military uniform does not strip the men and women of the
armed forces of the constitutional safeguards and judicial protection
afforded to civilians.139 Accordingly, there are no individuals “more
entitled to the protection of their constitutional rights than the servicemen
engaged in protecting the sovereignty of the United States.”140 The
Supreme Court has consistently applied the protections of the Bill of Rights
to military personnel, except in instances where the express terms of the
Constitution are plainly inappropriate.141 While the nature of being in the
armed forces may limit those rights, the government must justify the
limitations.142 The government contends that military necessity is a
compelling interest because the military must remain a strong fighting
force;143 however, “[t]he background material on the adoption of the UCMJ
indicates Congress made no findings as to the possible harmful
consequences of privately performed sexual acts upon the military
135. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003). The Court expressly states that
statutes seeking to control personal relationships are within the liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution of individuals to choose which sexual relationships to partake in without being
punished as criminals. Id. at 567. The implications and consequences of these statutes
touch upon the most private human contact in the most private of places, the home. Id.
136. Baime, supra note 122, at 126.
137. Baime, supra note 122, at 126. Contra Oliverson v. W. Valley City, 875 F. Supp.
1465, 1482 (D. Utah 1995). The claim to the right to commit adultery cannot be
fundamental because the historical development of the criminalization of adultery is in
direct opposition to any aspect of a historical right. Oliverson, 875 F. Supp. at 1482.
138. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Baime, supra note 122, at 126.
139. See United States v. Mitchell, 39 M.J. 131, 135 (C.M.A.1994) (citing Weiss v. United
States, 510 U.S. 163, 194 (1994) (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
140. Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel: Summary-Rep. of Hearings by
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. III (1962),
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/const-rights-mil-pers.pdf.
141. See United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 205–06 (2004).
142. See id.; United States v. Allen, No. ACM 32727, 1999 CCA LEXIS 116, 6 (A.F.Ct.
Crim. App. Apr. 22, 1999), aff’d, 53 M.J. 402 (2000); Baime, supra note 121, at 132.
143. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). The Supreme Court highlighted that
“the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society . . . [and in
order] to maintain the discipline essential to perform its mission effectively, the military has
developed what ‘may not unfitly [sic] be called the customary military law’ or ‘general
usage of the military service.’” Id. at 743–44.
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community.”144 Under Article 134, the adulterous act must be prejudicial
to good order and discipline or service discrediting in order to constitute an
offense under the UCMJ.145 The language of Article 134 only expressly
identifies adulterous acts, which are “obvious” or “open and notorious” as
conduct that warrants prosecution.146 Yet, Article 134 does not expressly
state that private and discreet acts are prejudicial to good order and
discipline or service discrediting.147 Furthermore, the United States Army
Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that a right to privacy in the martial
relationships exists in the military context.148 In light of this, military
necessity should only encompass acts that hinder a soldier’s military
function,149 rather than a complete ban, which comes very close to
infringing on a soldier’s right to privacy.150
B. RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
Adultery was not prohibited until women were integrated into the
armed forces, emphasizing the argument that all soldiers deserve due
process protection.151 In the late 1970s, the Women’s Army Corp
disbanded, and consequently the number of women serving in the main
body of the military increased.152 This integration corresponds with the
inclusion of adultery under Article 134 in the 1984 amendment of the
MCM.153 Since there is no civilian equivalent to the military’s broad
144. United States v. Scoby, 5 M.J. 160, 165 (C.M.A. 1978); see also 144 CONG. REC.
H11.776 (1998) (“Sexual misconduct and adultery are private acts and are none of
Congress’ business.”).
145. See MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2).
146. See MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2). Adulterous conduct is directly
prejudicial to good order and discipline is conduct that has an obvious, and measurably
divisive effect on unit or organization discipline, morale, or cohesion, or is clearly
detrimental to the authority or stature of or respect toward a service member. MCM 2012,
supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2). “Discredit” is defined as injuring the reputation of the
armed forces, including adulterous conduct that has a tendency, because of its open or
notorious nature, to bring the service into disrepute, make it subject to public ridicule, or
lower it in public esteem. MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2).
147. See MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2). While adulterous conduct that is
private and discreet in nature may not be service discrediting by this standard, under the
circumstances, it may be determined to be conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.
MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2).
148. See United States v. Arab, 55 M.J. 508, 518 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2001) (suggesting
that there is a right to martial privacy in the military; however, it will not apply in cases
where there is violence).
149. Esquivel, supra note 13, at 854. For example, “proscriptions against adultery with a
subordinate, or with the spouse of a service-member, or during deployment would
reasonably satisfy the requirement of an important governmental interest.” Esquivel, supra
note 13, at 857.
150. See Burke, supra note 39, at 337.
151. See Hopkins, supra note 8, at 235.
152. See Michael J. Hargis, The Password is “Common Sense”: The Army’s New Policy
on Senior - Subordinate Relationships, 1999 ARMY LAW 12 (Mar. 1999).
153. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 234–35.
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punishment for adultery,154 adultery should only be considered a crime
when it affects a service member’s ability to perform their military
duties.155 In essence, because the military is able to prosecute adultery in
any instance under this amendment, soldiers are being denied due process
under the Fifth Amendment.156 This is especially apparent in marriages
where one spouse is a service member and the other is not.157 Due to the
general lack of enforcement and prohibition in the civilian sector, a civilian
spouse is typically free to commit adultery without criminal
consequence.158 Even if a civilian spouse were to face adultery charges, the
punishment is by no means equal.159 It is not to say that soldiers must be
treated just like civilians, but rather, soldiers must be given more protection
in light of the lack of punishment in the civilian sector.
In this instance, because an adultery investigation only begins when
adulterous activity is reported,160 a soldier may fall prey to a vindictive
spouse161 seeking retribution.162 Consequently, the complete prohibition
against adultery creates nothing more than a double standard.163 A service
member can be investigated simply because a vindictive spouse wants to
gain leverage, whereas a service member has no legal recourse if a civilian
spouse has an extramarital affair, except to file for divorce.164 This is not to
say that the military’s prohibition on adultery serves no purpose in
marriages, where one spouse is a soldier and one is not. The prohibition
serves as a tool to give spouses peace of mind, especially during times of
deployment, that there is a consequence for breaking marriage vows.
154. See discussion on the lack of criminalization compared to the harsh punishment under
the UCMJ supra Part II.
155. See Esquivel, supra note 13, at 855–56.
156. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 (2012). “No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” Id.
157. See discussion on the inequality between civilian and military spouses infra notes
167–171.
158. See supra Part II.
159. See supra notes 58, 64.
160. See Sciolino, supra note 75.
161. See Major Guilford, Family Law Note Counseling Clients About Extramarital Sex
Prior to Divorce, 1989 ARMY LAW 41 (July 1989); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent:
A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1488 (2000). The vindictive wife
was used as a defense to marital rape in order to prevent wives from pursuing false rape
charges in order to gain leverage in a divorce suit, however; there is no empirical evidence
showing that wives were specifically prone to make false charges of marital rape. See
Hasday, supra. Infidelity typically engenders hurt, embarrassment, and anger, especially
when the adultery is public knowledge. See Guilford, supra. A relationship while the
divorce is pending can create these feelings, and the risk is that the spouse will seek
vindication or revenge. See Guilford, supra.
162. See Esquivel, supra note 13, at 855–56 (the author discusses this issue in terms of a
service-member’s spouse being preyed upon by a civilian, but the same rules apply in this
instance).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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However, what can be used for good can also be used for evil. Under the
plain language of Article 134, soldiers are subject to prosecution for
adultery unless they are legally divorced.165 Yet, under the Fifth
Amendment, no person shall be deprived of his or her liberty.166 Thus, if a
separation occurs during a deployment, or other training separating the
soldier from his or her family, the civilian spouse is free to conduct himself
or herself as a single person, while the soldier remains trapped by the
confines of marriage.
The language of Article 134 does not afford due process to service
members when only the service member, and not their spouse, is subject to
the harsh consequences under the UCMJ.167 For instance, if a civilian
spouse wants to contest a divorce for a number of years, the language of
Article 134 mandates that a service member must abstain from all sexual
relationships until the divorce is finalized, or face serious consequences.168
Likewise, a soldier with a civilian spouse cannot mutually decide to partake
in an open marriage without facing unequal consequences, because the
soldier remains subject to the provisions of Article 134, regardless of
spouse approval.169 In light of the clear disadvantage that the plain
language of Article 134 entails, the government should not be allowed to
enforce laws that “abridge the privileges” of soldier citizens170 unless they
are provided with enough protection under the Due Process Clause to
prevent the injustice of false accusations from harming their career. In this
instance, service members are treated differently solely due to the fact that
they are members of the armed forces.171 This author does not argue that
soldiers should not be treated differently; they are different. But their
willingness to serve their country should not place them at a disadvantage.
For this reason, the prohibition against adultery should only be limited to
165. See MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(3); See Guilford, supra note 161, at 41.
“A marriage exists until it is dissolved in accordance with the laws of a competent state or
foreign jurisdiction.” MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(3). Unless the marriage is
terminated, sexual relations with anyone other than a spouse constitutes adultery. This is
true whether or not a separation agreement has been executed and regardless of any
language it may include about how each party is entitled to live free of interference from the
other. See Guilford, supra note 161, at 41.
166. See supra note 156; see infra note 171.
167. See discussion on disparate treatment supra Part III.B.
168. See MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)–(d).
169. MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)–(d).
170. See Olympic Arms v. Magaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1069–70 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
Although, there is no textual support to in the Constitution itself that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal government, if the federal
government acts in a manner that would violate the Equal Protection Clause, it will be in
violation of the implied equal protection guarantees under the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. Id.
171. See E. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188
(1962). This idea is consistent with the idea that “our citizens in uniform may not be
stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.” Id.
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instances where it is clearly detrimental to a service member’s role in the
military.172

VI. JUSTIFYING NECESSITY
While the military maintains that “military necessity” justifies the
complete prohibition on adultery, that is not the only rationalization it relies
on.173 The complete prohibition against adultery is also aimed at regulating
individual moral behavior174 and preserving marriage.175 Many courtsmartial have found that moral turpitude is innately prejudicial, which
allows the prosecution to fulfill its burden of proof by simply declaring the
alleged conduct was morally reprehensible.176 Nevertheless, the military
has offered no clear definition of what constitutes immoral behavior,177 and
courts-martial have been unable to consistently agree.178 For example, in
United States v. Greene,179 the court found that false swearing was
immoral, but in United States v. Johnson,180 lying was not. If military
courts cannot agree on whether synonyms constitute immoral behavior,
how can an individual soldier? Without a clear definition, the military is
free to choose from an unknown number of acts that could be considered
immoral.181 Furthermore, the remarkable number of individuals who are
currently having, or have previously had, extramarital relationships clearly
illustrates the futility of continuing a battle on morality.182 Recognizing
172. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986). In Justice Stevens’ dissent, he
makes it very clear that the government’s traditional view that a particular practice is
immoral is not a sufficient compelling interest and, therefore, upholding a law that prohibits
the practice is not justified. Id. He also notes that neither history, nor tradition, could save
laws prohibiting miscegenation from being held unconstitutional. Id.
173. See discussion on military necessity supra notes 143–146.
174. See Maravilla, supra note 72, at 671. See generally Jeremy D. Weinstein, Adultery,
Law, and the State: A History, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 225–26 (1986) (explaining that
adultery has been seen as entirely an offense against morality and chastity since the
beginning).
175. See United States v. Brown, 2005 WL 2381094 at *4 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005).
176. See Annuschat, supra note 8, at 1179.
177. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, in the military context moral turpitude is “any
conduct for which the applicable punishment is a dishonorable discharge or confinement not
less than one year.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1101 (9th ed. 2009).
178. See infra notes 179–80.
179. United States v. Greene, 34 M.J. 713, 714 (A.M.C.R. 1992).
180. United States v. Johnson, 39 M.J. 1033, 1038 (A.M.C.R. 1994).
181. See Annuschat, supra note 8, at 1180; William Sherman, The Civilianization of
Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REV. 3, 81 (1970) (noting that in a pluralistic society, such as
ours, it is difficult to find universal agreement as to the meaning of subjective terms).
182. See Phyllis Coleman, Who’s Been Sleeping In My Bed? You, Me, and the State Makes
Three, 24 IND. L. REV. 399, 401 (1991); see also Siegel, supra note 27, at 45. While
adultery laws may have served a legitimate purpose when they were enacted, they fail to
reflect the current reality that societal views of imposing morality have changed. Coleman,
supra, at 401. Despite societal views on morality, adultery affects most marriages. Siegel,
supra note 27, at 45.
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this, the Supreme Court recently held that promoting morality is not a
sufficient compelling interest to justify the prohibition of sodomy.183
Moreover, military courts recognize that it is not the military’s place to
regulate the wholly private moral conduct of individuals.184 Consequently,
morality does not justify the prohibition of adultery when it is outside the
scope of the soldier’s military role.185
Because a soldier’s pay and housing benefits are directly related to the
status of their dependents, the military justifies the broad prosecution of
adultery in the name of preserving the sanctity of marriage and protecting
the innocent spouse.186 There is no argument that adultery is a victimless
crime.187 Like any act that is contradictory to the traditional view of
marriage, adultery has the potential to cause emotional harm to family
members.188 The Supreme Court has traditionally held the intimate
relationship of a marriage in the highest regard.189 However, there is a
strong argument that the government’s interest in preserving the marital
relationship is sufficient neither to justify the intrusion necessary to
discover the affair, nor to trample the fundamental right of privacy
guaranteed by the Constitution.190

VII. BALANCING INTERESTS
Certain acts that are considered “prejudicial to good order and
discipline,” or are “service discrediting,” are not protected under the
Constitution. With this in mind, the governmental interest of redressing the
harm caused by adultery must be balanced against the intrusion into an

183. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding the sodomy statute
furthers no legitimate state interest to justify intrusion into personal and private lives of
individuals).
184. United States v. Snyder, 4 C.M.R. 15, 19 (C.M.A. 1952).
185. See generally Gabrielle Viator, The Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions after
Lawrence v. Texas, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 837, 855 (2006) (reasoning that adultery
prohibitions cannot stand after Lawrence v. Texas because state intrusion into the private
sexual lives of marriage individuals is analogous to the experiences of homosexuals).
186. See United States v. Brown, 2005 WL 2381094 at *4 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005)
(noting the military has an interest in the determination and preservation of marriage and
since adultery has a direct effect on the sanctity of marriage, the military has a justified
interest); Oliverson v. W. Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1484 (D. Utah 1995) (noting the
social costs of adultery on spouses and children).
187. See Oliverson, 875 F. Supp. at 1484.
188. Id.; see Viator, supra note 185, at 856 (noting that adultery can lead to divorce in
many instances). But see Siegel, supra note 27, at 56–57 (suggesting extramarital
relationships may happily co-exist with or even enhance marriage).
189. See Viator, supra note 185, at 839 (explaining the state has a justifiable interest in
intruding into the private sexual acts of individuals in order to protect the institution of
marriage and the innocent spouse).
190. See Coleman, supra note 182, at 401 (the government cannot justify a moral interest
because the battle is long lost, as extramarital affairs are a reality of current times.).
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individual’s fundamental right of privacy.191 The military incorrectly uses
the “separate society” theory articulated in Parker v. Levy192 to justify
limiting Lawrence’s influence and application on military cases.193
Although the Supreme Court has consistently granted constitutional
deference to discretionary military decisions when the military punishes
soldiers for conduct that would otherwise be protected under the
Constitution,194 these cases never contemplated a broad military necessity
for regulating the fundamental right of privacy concerning consensual
sexual acts.195 It is challenging to imagine a special military necessity or
justifiable link between consensual adult private sexual conduct and service
credibility, or good order and discipline.196 For that reason, Lawrence
should be applied to all military cases dealing with adulterous acts.197
In lieu of prosecuting all instances of adultery, or the instances when a
commander deems fit, the military must only prosecute when the

191. See United States v. Orellana, 62 M.J. 595, 599–601 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005); see
Viator supra note 185, at 857. The court found that the appellant’s conduct was prejudicial
to good order and discipline as well as service discrediting, and consequently, the conduct
was removed from the protection afforded by the Constitution. Orellana, 62 M.J. at 600–
01. In order for the criminalization of adultery to survive after Lawrence, the interests
between the state and the intrusion into private lives, must be balanced. See Viator, supra
note 185, at 857; Andrew Tilghman, Making a sex tape a crime for troops, court rules,
ARMY TIMES, May 29, 2013, http://www.armytimes.com/article/20130529/NEWS/
305290002/Making-sex-tape-crime-troops-court-rules (discussing the recent change making
sex tapes against military law).
192. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
193. See Major Steven Cullen, Prosecuting Indecent Conduct in the Military: Honey
Should We Get a Legal Review First?, 179 MIL. L. REV. 128, 130 (2004).
194. Id. at 160; see e.g., Parker, 417 U.S. at 743; Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,
509–10 (1986) (holding the military is not required to accommodate religious practices such
as wearing a yarmulke when it detracts from the uniformity sought by dress regulations).
195. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 751; Cullen, supra note 193, at 160. Parker is a clear
example where deference to military decisions should be used, in instances like freedom of
speech limitations for military members. Parker, 417 U.S. at 751.
196. Parker, 417 U.S. at 751; See generally Sherman, supra note 181, at 79. The power to
court-martial under vague standards tends to encourage an arbitrariness of command, which
is undesirable in itself and which can have an adverse effect upon morale. Sherman, supra
note 183.
197. See Sherman, supra note 181 (reasoning that the military may not impose a different
criminal standard than is applied to civilians). See generally United States v. Marcum, 60
M.J. 198, 206–07 (2004); United States v. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. 297, 304 (C.A.A.F. 2004). The
court determined that military courts must apply an “as applied” analysis to determine
whether the act is within the liberty interest of Lawrence. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206–07. The
“as applied” analysis consists of three questions the court must consider:
First, was the conduct that the accused was found guilty of committing of a
nature to bring it within the liberty interest identified by the Supreme Court?
Second, did the conduct encompass any behavior or factors identified by the
Supreme Court as outside the analysis in Lawrence? Third, are there
additional factors relevant solely in the military environments that affect the
nature and reach of the Lawrence liberty interest?
Marcum, 60 M.J., at 206–07.
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adulterous act affects a soldier’s military role.198 In order to ensure the
rights of the soldier are balanced with the interests of the military, the
elements required to prosecute must be revised in order to better define the
instances where adulterous acts are prejudicial to good order and discipline
or service discrediting.199 The justification for defining specific instances
lies within the broad power of commanders to choose when adulterous acts
are prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting and
when they are not.200 The selective enforcement due to broad commander
discretion is clear in the disparity of prosecutions and punishments that
soldiers receive.201 In light of this disparity, the current lack of specificity
allows commanders to file adultery charges in almost any instance, which
is inapposite to the protections guaranteed by the Constitution.202
Highlighting this issue in a discussion about the recent increase in sexual
crimes in the military, Anu Bhagwati, executive director of the Service
Women's Action Network, noted that “a major problem is that military
commanders are responsible for deciding what cases should move
forward.”203 In the military, perception is everything; the mere perception
that a soldier has committed adultery is going to tarnish his reputation and
hinder his career.
While the explanation for conduct that is prejudicial to good order and
discipline is relatively specific, the expansive definition of service discredit
indubitably includes all adulterous acts, which allows commanders to
enforce their own moral standards or pacify a spouse seeking retribution.204
In essence, the expansive definition moves Article 134 into the category of
a “statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due
process of law.”205 Thus, in order to guarantee that the adulterous acts are
198. See reasoning for only applying to a soldier’s military function, supra, Part V.
199. See discussion infra note 207.
200. See MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2). The MCM does not mandate a
commander to consider particular factors in determining whether the adulterous act justifies
prosecution, but instead, it uses the language of “should consider all relevant circumstances.”
MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2). This broad language allows the commander to
use as little or as much proof as deemed fit to justify adultery charges, as well as how much
credence to give each factor. MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2).
201. See discussion on disparate treatment and punishment supra Part III.B.
202. See discussion Part V.B.
203. Lolita C. Baldor, Sex Is A Major Reason Military Commanders Are Fired, ASSOC.
PRESS, Jan. 20, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/sex-major-reason-military-commandersare-fired.
204. See discussion on morality and spousal revenge supra Part VI. It is not the place of
the military to ensure a soldier’s spouse is vindicated when a soldier commits adultery. See
supra Part VI.
205. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914); Collins v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 634 (1914).
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actually interfering with a soldier’s duty and not at the sole prosecutorial
discretion of the commander, an additional element should be added to
specify the types of interferences with duty that warrant a soldier being
punished.206 My proposed revision of the elements is as follows:207
b. Elements.
(1) That the accused wrongfully had sexual intercourse with a
certain person;
(2) That, at the time, the accused or the other person was married to
someone else;
(3) That the sexual intercourse create an actual or clearly
predictable adverse impact on discipline, authority, unit morale,
unit cohesion, the ability of the command to accomplish its
mission, or the ability of the accused to perform their duties to
support the armed forces; and
(4) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or
was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.
The additional element would eliminate the subjective nature of the
circumstances a commander should consider, and would force the
commander to abide by the specifics of the elements.208 Therefore, subelements (a)–(i), which describe the circumstances a commander should
consider, would no longer serve a purpose and should be deleted.209
Additionally, since officers are also subjected to the expansive elements of
Article 133, which allow for punishment in almost any instance the military
deems fit, officers should not be prosecuted under Article 133 for adultery
unless the adulterous acts meet the requirements of the proposed revision of
Article 134.210 Under this revision, the elements themselves achieve the
balance between the military’s interest and the preservation of the soldier’s
fundamental right to privacy.211

206. See MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2).
207. Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY, 4–14(b) (Sept. 20,
2012) [hereinafter AR 600-20]. The proposed additional element and sub-elements include
the circumstances a commander should consider. (See MCM 2012, supra note 2, pt. IV, ¶
62(c)(2)), as well as instances when fraternization is punishable under the UMCJ. See AR
600-20, supra.
208. See discussion supra note 200.
209. Id.
210. See MCM 2012, supra note 1, pt. IV, ¶ 59(b).
211. See discussion on balancing the interests between the government and military
personnel supra Part VII.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
As it currently stands, the military uses necessity, morality, and the
preservation of marriage to justify limiting a soldier’s fundamental right to
privacy for adulterous acts, regardless if they actually hinder a soldier’s
military function.212 While the scope of an individual’s liberty interests are
being continually expanded in the civilian sector, the military uses an “as
applied” analysis to justify removing the conduct from the protections
established in Lawrence.213 Furthering the inequality, the ambiguous
language of Article 134 gives commanders the broad range of authority to
punish soldiers for any and all adulterous acts, even if the acts occur after
duty hours and in the privacy of a soldier’s home.214 This expansive
authority places soldiers at a potentially life-altering disadvantage, as the
potential for commanders to initiate an investigation according to their own
standards of morality or at the request of a vengeful spouse is grave.
Because service members voluntarily relinquish the privilege to
exercise their fundamental liberties in the capacity that civilians do, service
members should be allowed to exercise their right to privacy under the
Constitution without fear of prosecution in every instance.215 More than
that, soldiers should be given additional due process protection to ensure
justice is served for the accused and the accuser. There is no legitimate
reason to deny the very people who have sworn to protect the freedom
America stands for of the right use their own judgment to determine which
behaviors will compromise their military role.216 Following this rationale,
under the proposed revision, Article 134 would still serve as a deterrence
mechanism, just in a different capacity.217 Service members would be
subject to a more logical basis for prosecuting adultery: if the adultery
interferes with the military role, the soldier is punished.218 If the adultery
has no bearing on the service members’ ability to perform their military
role, there is no criminal consequence.219 Allowing service members to be
afforded the same right of sexual privacy does not hinder the purpose of the
military: to serve and protect.220

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See supra Part V.A and Part VI.
See discussion on “as applied” analysis supra Part VII.
See discussion on commander’s discretion supra notes 204–206.
See supra notes 198–200.
See Burke, supra note 39, at 336; Nunn, supra note 63, at 558.
See Esquivel, supra note 13, at 857.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Brown, 2005 WL 2381094 at *4 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005).

